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THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ORIENTATION
RITA M. KOPP*
HE 1967 session of the Illinois General Assembly voted, by a
two-thirds majority of each House, to submit to the voters the
question of whether a convention shall be called to revise, alter
or amend the Illinois Constitution. The present Illinois Constitution,
Article XIV, section 1, provides:
Whenever two-thirds of the members of each house of the General Assembly shall,
by a vote entered upon the journals thereof, concur that a Convention is necessary
to revise, alter or amend the constitution, the question shall be. submitted to the
electors at the next general election. If a majority voting at the election vote for a
convention, the General Assembly shall, at the next session provide for a conven-
tion .... (Emphasis added.)
The next general election will be held November 5, 1968. Since
this is also a presidential election year and the country is troubled
and divided by several issues of major national importance, the elec-
tion turnout is likely to be large. It becomes extremely important, then,
that the voters be made aware of the pressing need to re-examine the
state constitution. Ignoring the blue ballot amounts to a "no" vote
since Article XIV, section 1 requires an affirmative vote by a majority
of those voting at the election and not just a majority of those voting
on the proposition. Of course, if the voters of Illinois, after carefully
considering the matter, decide that a Constitutional Convention should
not be called, it is their privilege and right to defeat the question
this coming November. It would be sad, however, to see the proposition
defeated solely by voter apathy.
A citizen might well ask why he should be concerned about a state
constitution. Haven't we been getting along reasonably well under
our present Constitution? It is the opinion of many legislators, attor-
neys and others concerned with state government that we have not
been "getting along reasonably well" with the present state Constitu-
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THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
tion. Structurally, many state governments, including that of Illinois,
are poorly organized to fulfill their functions within the American
federal system. States should form a bridge within the federal system
-a bridge between the central government dealing with nationwide
issues and the local governments concerned with community problems.
Increasingly weak state governments can have only one effect: more
and more power will ultimately be assumed by the central government.
Governor Daniel J. Evans of Washington stressed this point in his
second inaugural address in January, 1967:
State governments are unquestionably on trial today. If we are not willing to pay
the price, if we cannot change where change is required, then we have only one
recourse. And that is to prepare for an orderly transfer of our remaining responsi-
bilities to the federal government.'
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
Illinois has had three constitutions since it was admitted to state-
hood in 1818. The first constitution, effective December 3, 1818, was
relatively short, its main provisions being taken from the then-existing
constitutions of Kentucky, Ohio, New York and Indiana. The three
departments of government were differentiated, but the executive
power was made comparatively weak. The only officers elected by the
people were the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Sheriff, Coroner and
County Commissioners. The legislature had power to appoint nearly
all other state officers. The constitution provided for its amendment
only by a convention.
Pursuant to the requirements of the 1818 constitution, the General
Assembly, by a two-thirds vote, submitted to the voters a proposal to
call a Constitutional Convention in 1824 and again in 1842. Finally
the proposition carried in 1846, and the resulting constitution was
adopted in 1848.
Illinois' second constitution, effective April 1, 1848, was reflective
of the nationwide trend toward more popular government: appointive
powers of the legislature were severely curtailed and election of nearly
all officers was vested in the people.
In 1862 there was a Constitutional Convention which proposed a
new constitution. Unfortunately, the delegates became enmeshed in
1 THE COMMTMTEE FOR EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING STATE GOVERN=ENT
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investigations of various branches of the state government; they at-
tempted to ratify a proposed amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, to re-district the state for election of Congressional representa-
tives, to issue bonds and to enact laws by passing ordinances. The
nation was, of course, deeply divided at the time by the Civil War;
the proposed constitution was defeated by the voters who apparently
were disillusioned with the excesses of the convention and believed
that the delegates were promoting the cause of the South rather than
that of the North.
At the 1868 general election the voters again approved the call
for a constitutional convention. That convention met in Springfield,
on December 13, 1869, and completed its work by May 13, 1870.
The resultant Constitution was ratified by the voters July 2, 1870,
and became effective August 8, 1870. A number of previous defects
were remedied-the judiciary was reorganized, the governor's powers
were somewhat increased and restraints were placed on special legisla-
tion, ending the practice of granting corporate charters or divorces
by special (private) bills submitted to the legislature. The Constitution
of 1870 still serves Illinois today, although it has been amended
fourteen times. (See Appendix I.)
There have been several attempts to revise the 1870 Constitution,
but only one convention was actually called. At the 1918 general elec-
tion a majority of voters approved the call, and the convention met from
1920 to 1922. Unfortunately, the convention bogged down in detail;
much time was spent in gathering background material in an attempt
to rewrite the entire Constitution and debate raged over some four
hundred separate proposals for change. The convention recessed twice
and serious splits developed between the Cook County and "down-
state" factions-particularly with regard to legislative reapportion-
ment, revenue and taxation. The voters overwhelmingly rejected the
proposed constitution by a state-wide majority of four to one, and
by a majority of twenty to one in Cook County. The question carried
in only twenty-six of Illinois' 102 counties.
Some of the factors contributing to the defeat of the 1922 constitu-
tion were:
1. The convention attempted to rewrite the entire Constitution,
including sections with which there was really little dissatisfac-
tion.
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2. There was no attempt to spotlight those sections which needed
attention to establish an order of priorities for considering their
revision.
3. Nearly three years elapsed before the final draft was ready for
submission to the voters, resulting in loss of popular interest and
confidence.
4. The document was much too long and detailed; several sections
were thinly veiled attempts to curtail for all time any growth of
power in Chicago and/or Cook County.
5. The constitution was submitted to the voters as a single unit
without separating the more controversial provisions as had
been done in 1870.
Illinois, then, continues to struggle along with an archaic state
Constitution, filled with detail and burdened with instructions which are
properly the province of statutory law. It is a reflection of conditions
existing in the state nearly a century ago. The passage of time alone
should indicate the need for re-examining the state Constitution, even
absent the facts that the population of Illinois has risen from 2.5
million in 1870 to more than twelve million today, and that the state
has changed from a rural to an industrial one.
SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION
The Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development is composed of fifty Trustees from among the
two hundred businessmen and educators who comprise the Committee
for Economic Development. This Research and Policy Committee,
being very concerned about the effectiveness of state government
within the United States, issued its report in July, 1967, presenting,
inter alia, the following general recommendations:
1. State constitutional revision should have highest priority in restructuring state
governments to meet modem needs. Stress should be placed on repealing limita-
tions that prevent constructive legislative and executive action, on clarifying
the roles and relationships of the three branches of government, on permitting
thorough modernization of local government in both rural and urban areas, and
on eliminating matters more appropriate for legislative and executive action.
2. In our judgment, no state legislature should have more than one hundred mem-
bers in total; smaller states would be better served by still fewer members. In
all states, sessions should be annual, without time limitations for adjournment.
Committees should be few in number, organized along broad functional lines
19681
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and supplied with strong staff support. Public hearings should be held on all
major legislation. Legislators should serve four-year terms and receive salaries
commensurate with their responsiblities and equal to at least half that of the
governor.
3. Governors should become chief executives in fact as well as in name. Except
for a jointly elected lieutenant governor, the governor should be the state's
only elective executive official. He should have a four-year term, and freedom
to seek re-election without restriction as to number of terms. He should have
authority and responsibility for the development of long-range plans, program
supervision, budgetary preparation and execution, and personnel managemen t;
staff and other resources should be adequately suited to these functions. The
governor should have appointive and removal powers over all major executive
department heads. The governor's salary should be at least that of a member
of Congress (now $30,000 annually); chief executives of larger states should
receive substantially more.
4. State court systems should be modernized by adoption of recommendations
made repeatedly and consistently by study commissions reflecting the views of
the judiciary, bar associations and qualified citizens. Specifically, all judicial
functions now performed by local courts should be brought into a single state-
wide system. Each legislature should have authority to create new courts and
abolish existing ones as the need arises, and to provide for the unified adminis-
tration of the entire system. Judges should be appointed for long terms. Min-
imum levels of judicial compensation should be sufficient to command respect.
5. Two-party competition should be deliberately fostered in every state. Party
organization and nominating procedures should receive intensive scrutiny to
assure their responsiveness and representative character, and to encourage
active citizen participation.
6. Interstate cooperation in solving mutual problems should be exploited actively
through interstate compacts. Positive encouragement should be given to coun-
ties and other local units seeking collaboration with their counterparts both
within the state and beyond its boundaries. Wider adoption of uniform state
laws is needed. Active experimentation with new formulas for federal-
multistate cooperation should be encouraged. All these measures can be taken
without constitutional revision.
Stagnation and inertia have been characteristic of too many American state
governments. Obsolete legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms have
produced weak response to the needs of the people in these times of sweeping
social and economic change.2
The foregoing general recommendations of the Committee for Eco-
nomic Development seem to fit the situation in Illinois all too well.
Some of the articles of the Illinois Constitution which have been
suggested for thorough reconsideration are:
1. The Revenue Article. The constitution should grant to the legis-
lature sufficient authority to provide an equitable tax structure. It is
felt by many that real property cannot continue to bear a heavy tax
burden, and that the Retailers Occupation Tax is unfair and regressive
2 1d. at 15.
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in effect. The chief source of revenue for local taxing units is the gen-
eral property tax, about four-fifths of which comes from real estate
taxes and one-fifth from personal property taxes. This general property
tax was a major source of state revenue until 1932. Since then it
has been reserved for local units, but the General Assembly is free to
levy another general property tax for state use, in addition to that
now levied by local governments. Sales and use taxes constitute the
largest single source of income for the state government.3
2. The Short Ballot. It has been contended that the ballot should
be shortened to allow the electors to vote intelligently on the "key"
officials who are the real policymakers. A number of offices, now elec-
tive, could be filled as well, or better, by appointment.
3. Annual Legislative Sessions. The problems of running a govern-
ment in an industrial state like Illinois are both large and complex.
It is unrealistic to expect that the legislature can meet for six months
and prepare an adequate biennial program. Many unforeseen changes
in economic conditions could affect tax receipts and government expen-
ditures. The present procedure has resulted in frequent resort to special
sessions for enactment of deficiency appropriations in some depart-
ments and corrections of overappropriations in other departments.
From the standpoint of sound fiscal management, the present proce-
dure has not proved satisfactory.
4. Size and Working Conditions of the General Assembly. Presently
the State Senate is composed of fifty-eight members; the House has
177 members. Their salaries (presently $18,000 per biennium) plus a
small travel and postage allowance, combined with lack of work
facilities and staffing do not exactly make for an efficient state legis-
lature, no matter how sincere and well-intentioned most of its mem-
bers are.
5. Local Autonomy. Chicago and other large cities should have
some measure of control over their problems, such as transportation,
urban planning, etc., without frequent recourse to the legislature.
6. Amendments. The amendatory provisions of the Constitution
itself should be re-examined.
7. Obsolete Provisions. Among these are provisions for street rail-
roads, railroad corporations, warehouses, drains and ditches, banking
law referenda, the Columbian Exposition of 1893, and specific provi-
sions dealing with the Illinois Central Railroad and the Illinois-
8 LEAGuE Or WoMaN VOTERs oF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS VOTERS HANDBOOK (1966).
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Michigan Canal. All such obsolete matter could be deleted in one
stroke if the convention should decide to do so.
These are only a few of the items which have been suggested for
re-examination. The voters are not being asked to consider these
issues on November 5, 1968; they are asked only to vote on whether
a convention should be called to revise, alter or amend the entire state
Constitution.
WHAT METHODS OF AMENDMENT ARE AVAILABLE?
Presently the Illinois Constitution provides for two methods of
amendment: the convention and the Gateway method.4 The particu-
lar method to be employed is determined by the General Assembly.
A Constitutional Convention to revise, alter or amend the Constitu-
tion may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of each House of the
General Assembly and submitted to the voters at the next general
election. It is such a proposal which is being submitted on November
5, 1968. If this proposal is approved by a majority of those voting
at the election, the General Assembly must then order a special elec-
tion at which 116 delegates will be chosen, two from each State
Senatorial district. The General Assembly also fixes the date for con-
vening the delegates, fixes their pay, and makes the necessary appro-
priation.
The delegates are under no mandate to rewrite the entire constitu-
tion, but only to re-examine and consider the document as a whole.
Parts of the present Constitution might well remain unchanged; other
parts might be revised; other matters which are more properly the
province of statutory law or which have simply become obsolete might
be deleted.
The revised constitution is then submitted directly to the voters at
an election scheduled by the Convention for that purpose. The Con-
vention also decides how the proposition should be submitted to the
voters-whether on a section-by-section basis, or as an entire unit, or
as a unit with certain controversial sections being submitted separately.
A simple majority vote of the electorate is required for passage.
The second method of amendment, the so-called Gateway method,
liberalizes these requirements somewhat. A proposed constitutional
amendment may originate in either House of the General Assembly.
4 ILL. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1 and 2.
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If approved by a two-thirds vote of each House, it is submitted to
the voters at the next general election. Passage requires approval by
either a majority voting in the election or two-thirds of those voting
on the proposition. The Gateway method, however, contains two
limitations: (1) not more than three articles may be submitted to the
voters at any one election, and (2) no article may be considered
oftener than once in four years. Thus the Gateway method would not
allow re-consideration of the state Constitution as a whole. It would
take several years of Gateway amendments to even delete certain
obsolete material presently in the constitution.
Under the "majority of those voting at the election" requirement,
those choosing not to cast a ballot are, in effect, counted as a "no"
vote. This result of voter apathy was not contemplated in the 1870
Constitution, which was itself adopted on a ballot on which the elector
had to cancel out a proposal on which he voted in the negative. If a
section was not cancelled, the vote was counted as an affirmative
one. This type of ballot, printed by each party and including the
party's stand on any proposed constitutional amendment, was used
until 1890. Voters were thus encouraged to follow the party's recom-
mendation by using the "party circle" to vote for all candidates and
issues.
With adoption of the Australian ballot in 1891, proposed constitu-
tional amendments were printed at the bottom of an official state-
printed ballot. During the period from 1892 to 1898, nearly seventy-
five percent of those voting in each election failed to vote on
constitutional amendments. From 1899 to 1929, constitutional amend-
ments were printed on a separate ballot; non-voting ranged from
twenty-five to forty percent of those voting in the election. From
1929 to 1949, constitutional amendments were printed on the left
side of the ballot. No amendments were adopted, and more than half
of all persons voting in the elections failed to vote on the constitu-
tional provisions.
When the Gateway Amendment was ratified in 1950, it was on a
separate blue ballot, and had been preceded by a well-organized cam-
paign. Adoption of Gateway outlawed any return to the "party circle"
ballot.'
5 LEAGuE o WoMx VoTERs o Iu.mois, A BsiE HISTORY OF CoNsTrruTIoNAL RE-
VISION ixJ Iuirois (1967).
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WHY ISN'T THE GATEWAY AMENDATORY PROCEDURE ADEQUATE?
The Gateway Amendment, which was submitted to the voters five
times (1892, 1896, 1924, 1932 and 1946) finally carried in 1950. It
provides that any amendment to the Constitution must originate in
the legislature, where it must receive a two-thirds vote in each House.
It is then submitted to the electorate at the next general election, with
alternative requirements for passage, as stated above. It was hoped
that the two-thirds rule would overcome some of the difficulties ex-
perienced in getting a majority of those voting in the election to vote
on the particular proposition.
Since adoption of the Gateway Amendment, fifteen constitutional
amendments have been submitted to the voters; nine failed and six
passed. Of the six which passed, four received a majority of the votes
cast in the election, and would not have needed the Gateway Amend-
ment for passage. The two amendments which needed Gateway to
pull them through were on rather specialized topics of limited interest
to the general electorateY
Analysis of the nine proposals which have failed since enactment
of the Gateway Amendment should not lead to the conclusion that
Gateway is utterly useless. It may be that the amendatory machinery
is not to blame. The failure of the amendments to carry may reflect
legitimate voter resistance. Attempts to amend the Revenue Article
(Article IX) have failed seven times since 1870-three times since
enactment of Gateway (1952, 1956 and 1966). While many consti-
titutional and economic experts are in accord that the present Revenue
Article is inadequate in the face of needs posed by today's industrial
and technological society, nevertheless any proposed changes in this
Article appear to pave the way for the imposition of a state income
tax, a scheme which seems clearly repugnant to Illinois voters. It may
be that the Revenue Article of the Constitution can never be amended
until it contains an express prohibition against a state income tax.
Consider also the attempts (in 1952, 1958 and 1966) to amend
6Reapportionment and redistricting (1954), change in officers and terms of the
Executive Department (1954), Illinois-Michigan Canal leasing procedures (1954) and
the Judicial Amendment (1962). Only two of the six amendments which passed needed
the Gateway provision to carry them: County officer's salaries (1952) and the banking
amendment (1952). Further analysis of the voting statistics of the nine amendatory pro-
posals which were defeated discloses that eight of them would have passed had the
Gateway Amendment required a mere majority of votes cast on the proposal itself,
rather than the two-thirds rule.
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Article X (County Officers). The Article provides that the Sheriff and
County Treasurer may not succeed themselves in office. Attempts at
amendment have failed in each case, possibly because the voters
consider it wise, especially in the case of a treasurer, to keep one
individual from becoming too long entrenched in office.
Other proposed amendments which have failed to pass, despite the
Gateway provision, quite possibly met defeat because of voter ig-
norance or apathy, or because of inadequate voter education efforts.
An example of such amendment is the Judicial Amendment which
failed in 1958, but which passed easily in 1962 following a concerted
campaign of voter education.
It has been suggested that consideration be given to modifying the
Gateway Amendment to require only a majority of those voting on
the proposition. This would be entirely consistent with the provisions
requiring a majority vote on an entirely new Constitution or parts
thereof, submitted after a Constitutional Convention. If a majority
vote is sufficient to adopt a new Constitution, it would seem reasonable
that a majority vote on each proposal should be sufficient when piece-
meal amendment is attempted. However, the present provision requir-
ing two-thirds vote of both Houses of the legislature before sub-
mission to the voters should be retained as a safeguard against hasty
and ill-considered changes.
CONCLUSION
Some of the arguments advanced in favor of or against the call of
a Constitutional Convention are summarized in Appendix III. It is
hoped that the voters of Illinois can be persuaded that the entire con-
stitution should be re-examined by a convention of delegates elected
for that purpose. We must not ignore the blue ballot on November 5,
1968; failure to vote on the proposition amounts to a "no" vote.
If a Convention is called, the election of delegates will probably be
scheduled for the middle of 1969; delegates would probably convene
in the fall of 1969 or later. When their work is finished it will be sub-
mitted for voter approval-hopefully by the middle of 1970. At that
time, the voters will have their chance to approve or reject the product
of the Convention.
Voter education campaigns currently being conducted by a number
of organizations are properly stressing, first, that voter apathy must
1968]
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not be allowed to defeat the proposed call of a Constitutional Conven-
tion; second, a "yes" vote on November 5, 1968, is not tantamount
to approving certain substantive changes, e.g., a state income tax;
third, the electorate will have an opportunity to elect convention dele-
gates of their choice, and finally, there will be another election at which
the product of the Convention will be accepted or rejected. There is
little hope that the Convention will be called, unless these points are
conveyed to the public.
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
APPENDIX I
AMENDMENTS PROPOSED TO THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1870*
Total Vote Vote
Year
1878
1880
1884
1886
1890
1892
1894
1896
1904
1908
1916
1924
1926
1930
1932
1938
1942
1944
1946
1950
1952
1952
Total Vote VoteSubject Matter
Drainage and Ditching,
Article IV, Sec. 31
County Officers, Art. X,
Sec. 8
Veto of Appropriation
Items, Art. V, Sec. 16
Anti-Contract Convict
Labor
World's Fair Bonds, Art.
IX, Sec. 13
Gateway Amendment,
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Labor Laws
Gateway Amendment,
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Chicago Charter, Art.
IV, Sec. 34
Deep Waterway Bonds
Revenue, Art. IX, Sec.
14
Gateway Amendment,
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Revenue, Art. IX, Sec.
14
Revenue, Art. IX, Secs.
1, 2, 9, 10
Gateway Amendment,
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Banks, Art. XI, Sec. 5,
6, 7, 8
Revenue, Art. IX, Sec. 1
County Officers, Art. X,
Sec. 8
Gateway Amendment,
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Gateway Amendment
Art. XIV, Sec. 2
Revenue, Art. IX, Secs.
1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13
County Officers, Art. X,
Sec. 8
Vote
448,796
622,306
673,096
574,080
677,817
871,508
873,426
1,090,869
1,089,458
1,169,330
1,343,381
2,579,860
1,912,706
2,332,696
3,465,926
3,274,814
3,049,312
4,079,024
3,619,322
3,731,618
For
295,960
321,552
427,821
306,565
500,299
84,645
155,393
163,057
678,393
692,522
656,298
704,665
651,768
371,812
1,080,541
922,237
979,892
898,107
1,273,653
2,512,323
Against
60,081
103,966
60,244
169,327
55,073
93,420
59,558
66,519
90,038
195,177
295,782
397,835
476,455
513,861
275,329
352,428
346,232
653,877
368,108
735,903
1,157,406
1,084,864
2,996,885 1,838,596
(on amendment)
3,039,455 1,953,675
(on amendment)
Result
Carried
Carried
Carried
Carried
Carried
Failed
Failed
Failed
Carried
Carried
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Carried
Failed
Failed
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APPENDIX I (Continued)
Total Vote Vote
Year Subject Matter Vote For Against Result
23. 1952 Counties, Salary 3,005,155 2,024,823 979,401 Carried
Limitations Art. X,
Sec. 10
24. 1952 Corporations, Banks
Article XI, Sec. 6
25. 1954 Legislative Department
Art. IV, Secs. 6, 7, 8
26. 1954 Executive Department
Art. V, Secs. 1, 2, 3
27. 1954 Illinois Michigan Canal
28. 1956 Revenue, Art. IX, Secs.
1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13
29. 1958 Judicial, Art. VI
30. 1958 County Officers, Art. X,
Sec. 8
31. 1962 Judicial, Art. VI
32. 1964 Annual Legislative
Sessions Art. IV, Sec.
9
33. 1964 Continuity of
Governmental Opera-
tions in Periods of
Emergency Art. IV,
Sec. 35
34. 1966 Revenue, Art. IX, Secs.
1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 13
35. 1966 County Officers, Art. X,
Sec. 8
(on amendment)
3,018,665 2,072,965
(on amendment)
2,610,726 2,085,224
(on amendment)
2,555,801 2,024,483
(on amendment)
2,534,706 2,011,134
(on amendment)
3,547,282 1,408,132
(on amendment)
944,845 Carried
525,502 Carried
531,318 Carried
523,572 Carried
2,139,150
2,483,158 1,589,655 893,503
(on amendment)
2,519,486 1,420,011 1,099,475
(on amendment)
3,812,120
(total votes at election)
3,288,154 2,166,917 1,121,237
(on amendment)
4,796,641
(total votes at election)
3,629,803 2,290,265 1,339,540
(on amendment)
4,796,641
(total votes at election)
3,572,966 2,297,095 1,275,871
(on amendment)
3,928,478
(total votes at election)
3,076,879 1,642,549 1,434,330
(on amendment)
3,928,478
(total votes at election)
3,055,739 1,808,491 1,247,248
(on amendment)
Failed
Failed
Failed
Carried
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
* Source: Constitution of the State of
State, Springfield, Illinois, 1967.
Illinois, issued by Paul Powell, Secretary of
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APPENDIX II
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1965
WENT
0, 1965
"ALL OTHER PURPOSES
N. 4.50
Dlebt Service 2.60
AFET Conservation
PUBLI SATY and Parks 1.10
GENERAL GOVERNMENT 3.00 miscellaneous .#
5Vf
*LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, ILLINOIS VOTER'S HANDBOOK (1966).
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SUMMARY OF SOME
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST
CALLING A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Against
1. State governments, as sovereign
units, are moribund; they are im-
portant only as administrative di-
visions of the federal government
in carrying out such nationwide pro-
grams as transportation, education,
health, social welfare, air and water
pollution.
2. The present Gateway procedure is
adequate. Amendments can be sub-
mitted separately. Reference to
more than one subject will make
the matter too complicated for the
average voter.
3. Recent experiences in other states,
e.g. New York and Michigan, are
evidence of the futility of attempt-
ing any comprehensive constitu-
tional reform.
4. A Constitutional Convention is too
costly to undertake at a time when
Illinois' fiscal condition is still pre-
carious. New York's convention,
for example, was estimated to have
cost $10 million.
5. Since delegates to a Constitutional
Convention would be elected from
Senatorial districts, the views and
interests of the Senate, which fa-
vors business and management,
would prevail, and the interests of
other groups, e.g. labor, would be
'jeopardized.
In Favor of
1. Federalism still exists, both consti-
tutionally and politically. Efficient
state governments are necessary to
implement and administer local
programs. Strong state governments
are our protection against the de-
velopment of an authoritarian, all-
powerful centralized government in
Washington.
2. Gateway has not lived up to the
expectations of its supporters. 15
proposals were submitted to the
voters since Gateway was enacted
in 1950; only 6 carried by the 2/3
vote on the amendment itself. Gate-
way limits the number and fre-
quency of amendatory proposals.
3. Illinois stands to profit from the
experiences of other states. The
New York document was submitted
as a single unit with no separation
of the more controversial issues.
In Illinois we have the precedent
of voting separately on controver-
sial proposals.
4. Possible expense of an Illinois Con-
stitutional Convention has been es-
timated by the Legislative Council
at $1.5 million. Even if the ultimate
cost is higher, it would still be less
than the cost of amending the Con-
stitution on a piece-meal basis over
a long period of time.
5. The Constitutional Convention
would be composed of specially se-
lected delegates, who are not ne-
cessarily legislators. Furthermore,
both political parties, which repre-
sent all segments of our society,
support the -calling of a Constitu-
tional Convention. It doesn't nec-
essarily follow that because a Sen-
atorial district favored one party
at some previous election, that the
convention delegates would neces-
sarily be of the same persuasion.
The political balance of power does
shift in many districts.
APPENDIX III (Continued)
Against
6. A Constitutional Convention might
propose revisions of articles which
the electorate would prefer to con-
tinue unchanged, e.g. the Revenue
Article or Judicial Article.
7. Rivalry between downstate and
Cook County factions may frus-
trate meaningful reform.
8 The Federal Constitution is much
older than the Illinois Constitution
and doesn't seem to need revision.
9. A new constitution would create
chaos because we would have to
write so many new laws and revise
many presently existing laws.
10. A new constitution will certainly
mean a state income tax.
In Favor of
6. The electorate will have ample op-
portunity to accept or reject those
provisions when the finished prod-
uct is submitted.
7. Rivalry does not totally impede
the enactment of significant and
progressive legislation in the Gen-
eral Assembly. Furthermore, it is
in the interest of the entire state
to modernize our governmental op-
erations so as to better serve all
the citizenry, whether residents of
urban or rural areas.
8. There is a basic difference between
a constitution for a union of states
and a constitution governing the
internal affairs of a state. The Fed-
eral Constitution is a grant of pow-
er-a statement of what the states
agree to do together. A state con-
stitution covers everything else.
9. All laws not in direct conflict with
the new constitution would remain
in effect. Improvements in the con-
stitution would admittedly require
new laws to implement them; this
would be similar to the legislative
session held after passage of the
judicial article. It was a busy ses-
sion, but there was no chaos. There
will be plenty of time to draft new
legislation to put the new constitu-
tion into operation.
10. Not necessarily. This depends upon
how the Revenue Article is amended
and whether the voters approve the
final product. The details of a re-
vised Revenue Article can best be
thrashed out by a convention which
has the time to relate the revenue
structure to the over-all structure
of the constitution.
11. The present state Constitution
lacks an adequate reapportionment
article, pursuant to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's "one man one vote"
rule.
12. The amendatory process itself is
quite stringent; Illinois is in a mi-
nority of only 11 states which re-
quire a majority voting at the elec-
tion to call a constitutional con-
vention.
